How to Scan a Docker Image for Vulnerabilities (4 Ways)

What “scanning a Docker image” actually means

A Docker image is a stack of filesystem layers. A vulnerability scanner unpacks those layers and builds an inventory of everything installed, then checks each item against one or more vulnerability databases. There are two distinct categories it inventories:

• OS packages — read from the package manager's own database: /lib/apk/db/installed (Alpine), /var/lib/dpkg/status (Debian/Ubuntu), or the RPM database (RHEL/Fedora).
• Application dependencies— language ecosystems like npm (package-lock.json), pip, Go modules, Ruby gems, and Java JARs found inside the image.

The scanner then matches each package and version against vulnerability data and emits a list of findings: a CVE identifier, the affected package, a severity, and — ideally — the version that fixes it. If you want the deeper background on where that CVE data comes from, see our comparison of NVD, OSV, GHSA, and Snyk Intel.

Method 1 — Docker Scout (built in)

If you already have Docker Desktop or a recent Docker CLI, you have a scanner installed. Docker Scout reads your local image and reports CVEs with no extra tooling:

# Quick overview of an image
docker scout quickview my-image:tag

# Full CVE list, filtered to High and Critical
docker scout cves my-image:tag --only-severity critical,high

Scout is the lowest-friction option for a quick local check. Its weakness is depth: it is strongest on OS packages and the most common ecosystems, and it is tied to the Docker tooling. For a thorough audit you will usually reach for one of the dedicated scanners below.

Method 2 — Trivy

Trivy is the most widely used open-source image scanner. Install it, then point it at a local image, a remote image, or a saved tarball:

# Scan a local or remote image by name
trivy image my-image:tag

# Scan an exported tarball (no daemon needed)
trivy image --input my-image.tar

# Fail a CI build on High/Critical findings
trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL my-image:tag

Trivy is fast and covers OS packages plus most language ecosystems. The --exit-code 1 flag is the one to remember — it turns the scan into a build gate.

Method 3 — Grype

Grype, from Anchore, is the other popular open-source CLI. It pairs naturally with Syft (an SBOM generator from the same project) and reads the same image sources:

# Scan an image by name
grype my-image:tag

# Scan a saved tarball explicitly
grype docker-archive:my-image.tar

# Only fail on a severity threshold
grype my-image:tag --fail-on high

Grype and Trivy will often report slightly different counts on the same image. That is expected — they use different databases and matching rules. We dig into why in the 2026 scanner benchmark.

Method 4 — ScanRook (no install required)

If you do not want to install anything — or you want a single report that merges OSV, NVD, and vendor advisory data with EPSS exploit-probability scores — you can scan a Docker image with ScanRook in three ways:

• Web upload: export the image to a tar (see below) and drag it onto the ScanRook dashboard. No CLI, no agent.
• Registry scan: connect a registry (Docker Hub, GHCR, ECR, or any OCI-compliant registry) and scan an image by name and tag without pulling it yourself.
• CLI: install the scanner and run it locally:

  curl -fsSL https://scanrook.sh/install | bash
  scanrook scan my-image.tar

ScanRook also unpacks nested archives and shaded JARs that simpler file-path scanners miss, and it reads the actual installed package state rather than guessing from advisory metadata. That difference is the subject of our deep dive on installed-state scanning vs. advisory matching.

How to export an image to a tarball

Three of the four methods above can read a tarball, which is the most portable way to move an image to a scanner. Export any local image with docker save:

# Build, then export to a tarball
docker build -t my-image:tag .
docker save my-image:tag -o my-image.tar

The resulting my-image.tar contains every layer and the image manifest. This is exactly what you upload to ScanRook or feed to Trivy and Grype on a machine that does not have the original image loaded.

How to read the results

Every scanner reports the same core fields. Learn to read them and the output stops being a wall of red:

Do not sort by severity alone. Roughly half of all CVEs are rated High or Critical, so severity is a weak filter. Sort by exploit probability instead — see how to prioritize vulnerabilities with EPSS.

How to fix the vulnerabilities you find

Scanning is only half the job. Most findings fall into one of three buckets, each with a standard fix:

• OS package CVEs: rebuild on an updated base image (e.g. bump FROM debian:12.4 to the latest patch tag) or add an apt-get upgrade step. A stale base image is the single biggest source of findings.
• Application dependency CVEs:bump the dependency in your lockfile and rebuild. The scanner's “fixed version” column tells you the target.
• Smaller attack surface:switch to a minimal base image. A distroless or slim image simply contains fewer packages, so it has fewer CVEs to begin with — see Alpine vs Debian vs Distroless.

Automate it in CI/CD

A scan you run by hand once a month is not a control. Wire scanning into your pipeline so every image is checked before it ships, and fail the build on a threshold you choose. Here is the idea in a GitHub Actions step using Trivy:

- name: Scan image
  run: |
    docker build -t my-image:${{ github.sha }} .
    trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL my-image:${{ github.sha }}

ScanRook can do the same with a policy that gates deployments on severity, EPSS, or CISA KEV membership rather than a single severity threshold. For the broader playbook, read container scanning best practices.

Common pitfalls

• Scanning only the base, not the final image. Your application layers add dependencies. Always scan the final built artifact.
• Ignoring nested JARs.Java apps often bundle dependencies inside shaded or uber-JARs. A scanner that does not unpack them will miss real CVEs — this is exactly how Log4Shell hid in so many images.
• Treating every Critical as urgent. A Critical CVE in a package that is never reachable at runtime can wait; a High CVE with a public exploit cannot. Prioritize by exploitability.
• Scanning once. New CVEs are published daily. Re-scan deployed images on a schedule, not just at build time.

Frequently asked questions